Abstract: We consider a two player dynamic game played over T ≤ ∞ periods. In each period each player chooses any probability distribution with support on [0, 1] with a given mean, where the mean is the realized value of the draw from the previous period. The player with the highest realization in the period achieves a payoff of 1, and the other player, 0; and each player seeks to maximize the discounted sum of his per-period payoffs over the whole time horizon. We solve for the unique subgame perfect equilibrium of this game, and establish properties of the equilibrium strategies and payoffs in the limit.
Introduction
Here we examine the following simple scenario. There are two players; player 1 and player 2, and T ≤ ∞ periods. To start (in period 1), each player is assigned a mean in the interval [0, 1]: player 1 has mean x 1 and player 2 has mean y 1 . Without loss of generality we impose that x 1 ≥ y 1 . Player 1 then chooses a random variable X 1 distributed according to (Borel probability distribution) F 1 supported on [0, 1] with mean x 1 , and player 2 a random variable Y 1 distributed according to G 1 supported on [0, 1] with mean y 1 . This is done simultaneously, after which the two values of the random variables are realized.
The player whose random variable has the highest realization "wins" and receives a prize that we normalize to 1, and the loser receives 0. Denote the respective realizations x 2 and y 2 (note of course that x 2 may be greater than y 2 ). Period 1 ends and the players proceed on to period 2. As in the first period, each player chooses a random variable and distribution, but now the mean constraints are x 2 and y 2 , respectively. As in the first period, the player with the highest realization wins a prize of 1, and the loser 0. The same procedure occurs for the third period, the fourth, and so on, until period T occurs, after which the game ends. Each player shares a common discount factor for the future, β.
As a result, we have sequences of random variables (X 1 , Y 1 ), (X 2 , Y 2 ), . . . , (X T , Y T ) ; distributions, (F 1 , G 1 ), (F 2 , G 2 ), . . . , (F T , G T ) ; and means, (x 1 , y 1 ), (x 2 , y 2 ), . . . , (x T , y T ) . Given our construction, of random variables is a martingale and this is a "game of martingales".
In obtaining the subgame perfect equilibrium of the game, we proceed through backward induction.
Moreover, we see that in each period, a player's strategy depends only on his mean, his opponent's mean and the number of time periods remaining. Hence, we may drop the subscripts and instead may write each player's strategy as a function of his mean, his opponents mean, and τ , the number of periods until the game's termination.
This game has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium, which we may derive through backward induction. As in the one period scenario, the player with the higher mean chooses a distribution with a continuous portion on an interval [0, b], b ≤ 1 and if his mean is sufficiently high, places a point mass on
1. The player with the lower mean, does the same, with a weighing factor of y/x, but his distribution also has a mass point on 0.
Our setup also allows us to do some comparative statics, and we establish that as the length of the game grows infinitely long, and as the players become perfectly patient, the equilibrium strategies converge to ones in which the high mean player chooses a distribution that consists of a point mass on his mean, and the low player chooses a binary distribution with weights on 0 and the high player's mean. In a sense, as players become more patient, they become more cautious.
This paper uses results from [3] , and generalizes results from [3] , [2] , [1] , and [4] to a dynamic setting.
The Main Result and its Discussion
We present the following theorem and several corollaries, with the proof of Theorem 1.1 left to the next section. Recall that we may impose that x ≥ y without loss of generality for the "current" period.
Denote the final period by T , and for each period t define τ := T − t + 1; it is the number of periods left until the game ends.
Then the unique Subgame Perfect Equilibrium is 1. If x ≤ µ, player 1 chooses the random variable X ∼ F and player 2 chooses the random variable Y ∼ G where F and G are defined as
2. If x ≥ µ, player 1 chooses the random variable X ∼ F and player 2 chooses the random variable Y ∼ G where F and G are defined as
Each player's payoff is given by:
The proof of this result is simple and may be found in Section 2. Before proceeding further, we briefly take a look at its structure. That these distributions constitute an equilibrium is simple, and may be shown directly. We establish that this is a unique symmetric SPE through judicious use of techniques from the calculus of variations. We define the appropriate functional, and find the distribution that maximizes it in the form of an ordinary differential equation. The unique distributions that solve the ODE while satisfying the mean constraints constitute the unique symmetric equilibrium vector. Since this is a two player constant-sum game, we have uniqueness over the set of distribution pairs. See Figure   1 for a simulation of a sequence of equilibrium means of the game for T = 14.
Next, let's take a look at some properties of the equilibrium. It will prove illuminating to investigate the properties of the cutoff µ. In particular, we examine the effect of a change in β or τ on µ. First, β,
Thus, as players become more patient, µ increases. In the limit, as both players become maximally patient, we have
Of course, this expression goes to 1 as τ goes to infinity. Hence, for maximally patient players, as the terminal time becomes infinitely far away, µ goes to 1 and each player's strategy is dictated by the first part of Theorem 1.1. Pausing to double check that the order of limits is nothing to worry about (we're safe), we next look at the structure of the distributions in this limit.
In the limit, b goes to x, k goes to 1/x and so we see that the distribution converges to one in which the player with the highest mean puts a point mass of weight 1 on x and the other player puts weight y/x on x and 1 − y/x on 0. Intuitively, this makes sense, as the time horizon becomes infinite, players become more conservative, and in the the limit take no risks whatsoever.
We also look at the effect of an increase in τ on µ:
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As the length of time until the final period T increases, the crucial value, µ, increases and in the limit
Finally, note that if a player achieves a realization of mean 0 or 1, he must choose either 0 or 1 (respectively) with probability one in each successive period. Thus, these states are absorbing states.
Accordingly, it is easy to see that as T goes to ∞, the vector of distributions converges to one in which at least one player chooses a degenerate distribution on either 0 or 1, almost surely. In each period, outside of the absorbing states, one player will place positive weight on 0. However, it is possible that neither player will end up placing positive weight on 0 in the limit. In this case, both players must place a mass of weight 1 on 1.
Theorem 1.1 Proof
First, we present the following lemma from Boleslavsky and Cotton (2015) [3] : 
. If x ≥ 1/2, player 1 chooses the random variable X ∼ F and player 2 chooses the random variable Y ∼ G where F and G are defined as
The vector of payoffs is 1 − y 2x , y 2x .
Proof. See [3] .
Armed with this result, we may proceed inductively. Next, we examine the two period case.
Two Periods Remaining
As a result of Lemma 2.1, given discount factor β ≤ 1 and the period two payoffs under the equilibrium, player 1's period 1 payoff can be written as:
which reduces to
We write the following proposition:
Proposition 2.2. Let x be given by
The unique symmetric Subgame Perfect Equilibrium is, 
This reduces to u 1 = (1 + β) 1 − y 2x , which is player 1's payoff under the equilibrium. Thus, he has no profitable deviation. The analogous argument (without the k term) may be used for player 2 to show that she has no profitable deviation.
Lemma 2.4. Any Subgame Perfect Equilibrium must be those described in Proposition 2.2.
Establishing necessity is a little more involved. Player 1's problem is, given a strategy G for player 2, choose F to maximize Expression 2. That is, he solves
Now, we define the functional J[f ] as the Euler Lagrange equation
We take the functional derivative and set equal to 0:
We take the derivative with respect to w and rearrange, obtaining 2wG + 2(1 + β)G + 2βw 3wG + w 2 G − βG = 0
We can solve this differential equation and obtain
for constants C 1 , C 2 and C 3 . Since G(0) = 0, we must have C 2 = C 3 = 0. Moreover, since G(1) = 1, we have
Thus, we have F (w) = w 
2. Player 2 chooses the distribution G(z) = Proof. Proof of necessity is analogous to that for Theorem 2.2 and so is omitted. We establish sufficiency.
Suppose player 2 chooses distribution G(z) = ζz . The analogous argument (without the k term) may be used for player 2 to show that she has no profitable deviation. Now, we have the following proposition:
Then, at equilibrium there must be a point mass on 1 of size a played by player 1, where a satisfies
Proof. This result follows from the following pair of lemmata Lemma 2.7.
Proof. Suppose player 2 chooses a binary distribution that consists of two point masses of weight y on 1 and 1 − y on 0. Player 1 plays a distribution that consists of a point mass of weight a on 1 and a continuous portion with distribution F (w) on [0, b], b ≤ 1. Accordingly, player 2's payoff is
This must be less than or equal to (1 + β)y/2x. Hence,
Lemma 2.8.
Proof. Suppose player 2 chooses a binary distribution that consists of two point masses of weight p on b and 1 − p on 0, 1 where b is defined as
Player 1 plays a distribution that consists of a point mass of weight a on 1 and a continuous portion with distribution F (w) on [0, b]. Accordingly, player 2's payoff is
Take the first order condition with respect to a, yielding
Moreover, the second derivative of the left hand side is strictly positive, hence it is strictly convex. Thus, the unique minimizer of the left hand side is at a * . Substituting this in to u 2 , we obtain (1 + β) Finally, the equilibrium characterization: Proposition 2.9. Let x be given by
Then the unique symmetric Subgame Perfect Equilibrium is, 1. Player 1 chooses the distribution with a mass point of weight a on 1 and a continuous portion,
2. Player 2 chooses the distribution with a mass point of weight Proof. Again, proof of necessity is analogous to that for Theorem 2.2 and so is omitted. We establish sufficiency. Sufficiency follows through direct verification ut supra.
As we will see in the next subsection, the heavy lifting is done, and it is simple to proceed backwards and derive the equilibrium for an arbitrary τ . Proof. First we prove necessity: Lemma 2.11. Any symmetric equilibrium must satisfy the conditions given in Theorem 2.10.
τ Periods Remaining
Proof. Our proof is through induction. We know that for τ = 1, 2 the unique subgame perfect equilibrium and the resulting payoff for each of the players is that presented in Theorem 2.10. Suppose that for τ − 1 the equilibrium and payoff are as given above. This is equivalent to saying that each player, in the subgame commencing in period 2 achieves equilibrium payoffs of Accordingly, in period 1, player 1's payoff can be written as
where
But, Expression 3 is virtually identical to Expression 1, with γ instead of β. Solving in the same manner, we see that we have F (w) = w 
But, Expression 8 is virtually identical to Expression 4, with γ instead of β and j instead of k, and following the same steps, it is easy to see that there is no profitable deviation for either player.
Our proof is complete.
The remainder of the proof of Theorem 1.1, for cases We have established that the vector of strategies supra constitutes a symmetric SPE. However, this game is a two player constant-sum game, and standard arguments suffice to establish that this equilibrium is unique among all strategies.
